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    经济学(季刊) - 2020, Vol. 19(2): 411-432
    论文
    腐败、官员治理与经济发展
    Corruption, Officials Governance and Economic Development

    尹振东1, 聂辉华2
    ZHENDONG YIN1, HUIHUA NIE2

    1. 中央财经大学经济学院;
    2. 中国人民大学经济学院
    1. Central University of Finance and Economics;
    2. enmin University of China

    出版日期: 2020-06-22
    2020, Vol. 19(2): 411-432
    DOI: 10.13821/j.cnki.ceq.2020.01.02


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    摘要 本文建立了一个模型来解释腐败和经济发展的关系。企业采取不合规技术会导致经济增长,但会带来腐败问题。在经济发展早期,不合规技术的负外部性不大,官员的激励比较重要,此时会出现一个腐败均衡:高腐败、高增长、多事故和弱问责。在经济较发达时期,不合规技术的负外部性较大,政府会加强对企业的管制并严厉打击腐败,这导致了一个无腐败均衡:无腐败、低增长、无事故和强问责。本文的研究为反腐败和经济新常态提供了一个解释。
    关键词 腐败管制经济发展    
    Abstract:In this paper we establish a political economy model to clarify the relationship between corruption and economic development in China. In the early stage of economic development, there is a corruption equilibrium: high level of corruption, many accidents caused, high economic growth and weak accountability to bureaucrats. In advanced stage of economic development, the central government will fight corruption, leading to a non-corrupt equilibrium: no corruption, no accidents, low economic growth and strong accountability. This research explains the appearance anti-corruption campaign and the New Normal.
    Key wordscorruption    regulation    economic development
    ZTFLH:  D73  
      O12  
      H70  
    基金资助:国家自然科学基金面上项目(71572190、71773139)、国家社会科学基金项目(16BZZ077)、教育部重大课题攻关项目(18JZD048)以及中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金的资助。
    通讯作者: 聂辉华,北京市海淀区中关村大街59号,100872;电话:(010)82500210;E-mail:niehuihua@vip.163.com。     E-mail: niehuihua@vip.163.com
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